23 September 2008

Some Banking Industry Sources

Here's a listing of some sources of information on finance and banking:
Internationally, excellent research resources include the International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group) website and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

For historical research, try the Economics History (EH) website.

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21 September 2008

Commercial Banking

Commercial banking is what we usually think of when we speak of banks: an institution that accepts deposits from customers, and loans those deposits to others at a somewhat higher interest rate. There are many varieties of commercial bank, even within the United States, but the core function is to accept deposits and re-lend the money. Banks may also be involved in the expansion of credit.

Loan Banks

An early form of bank in Britain and North America, loan banks issued paper script backed by surety of real estate, merchandise, or personal security.1 During the period 1690-1740, businessmen in France and the English-speaking world made many attempts to introduce paper money, and they kept trying despite some disastrous failures (e.g., John Law's scheme). One particular loan bank scheme set up in Massachusetts (the Land Bank, 1740) had people "subscribe" by identifying land they wished to use as collateral, plus 40 shillings for each £1000 subscribed (that's about £1 per £500 lent). The principal was to be paid in 20 annual installments of 5% each, and 3% interest per annum. The loans were to be repaid in "manufactory notes" or hemp, flax, lumber, bar-iron, cast-iron, etc. Evidently these manufactory notes were supposed to be surrogates for actual English money in Massachusetts.2

While the Massachusetts Land Bank and its local rival, the Silver Bank, were liquidated the next year by the application of the 1719 "Bubble Act", another loan bank in Pennsylvania (1722) successfully introduced paper money through small loans. The land used as security for the loans was to be twice the value of the money lent. It has been noted that these early "banks" were not banks as we understand them, but batches of money.3 However, the loan banks served an essential function of creating the financial instruments that would first be used by the banking industry.
Read more »

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20 September 2008

Epitaph for an Industry: Investment Banking

Investment banks have long been separated from commercial and savings banks by federal law. When we speak of a "bank," we usually think of a business that takes money from depositors (savings accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts) and lends to other entities. The bank's income comes from the spread between the interest rate it pays on deposits, and the [higher] rate it charges on loans. This is not what investment banks do.

Deserted interior,
Lehman Europe HQ, Sep 2008

Click for larger image

An investment bank's customers are corporations issuing stock, bonds, or paper.1 When a company wants to issue stock, it approaches an investment bank to raise the money. The investment reviews the prospectus for the issuing firm, carries out its own research, and determines how much money can be raised on the capital (stock) or money (bonds, paper) markets. It draws up the actual securities and buys them from the client, then sells the securities on the capital markets. The difference between the face value of the stocks and their sale price is the IB's main source of revenue.

If the share issue is quite large, then the IB usually spreads the risk through syndication. The primary IB in contact with the issuing firm contacts other IB's and invites them to buy a share of the security issue; in the case of paper, the issue is routinely absorbed by a money market fund.2 Members of the syndicate usually make a firm commitment to distribute a certain percentage of the entire offering and are held financially responsible for any unsold portions. Selling groups of chosen brokerages assist the syndicate members meet their obligations to distribute the new securities. Members of the selling group usually act on a "best efforts" basis and are not financially responsible for any unsold portions.

IB's are not a very large sector of the Usonian economy: about $200 billion in total revenues for 2006,3 or probably 31% the size of the commercial banking sector.4 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac belong to neither sector. However, the smallish revenues belie the great importance of this business to the world economy. The US IB sector is immensely important to the coordination of capital markets; it mediates the best available data on sector growth in other industries, soundness of management at individual firms, etc., into capital allocation (bond and stock issues). Commercial banks traditionally address more routine needs for loans; they are usually more interested in the firm's balance sheet, rather than its long-run outlook for expansion or diversification. In a way, IB represents a disembodied and convicted guide to world industry, a not-so-invisible hand with its own peculiar ideological proclivities.

One of the most important New Deal measures was the Glass-Steagall Act (1933), which created firewalls between the different functions of banks. The most important of this was between investment banking and commercial/savings banking; another isolated financial firms generally from non-banking activities. After 1960, the Glass-Steagall Act was eroded by loopholes, until the last barriers were dissolved (1999); the financial services industry was opened up to homologization. There was an immense spike in the number of mergers, and in the value of the deals.5 Nearly all recent literature reviewed (i.e., published pre-2008) is emphatically in favor of even more consolidation, with the claim that further homologization in the financial services industry has created intense competition. Judging by the Japanese experience of the late '90's, it seems plausible that the banking regulators will see consolidation as a low-cost way of resolving bad balance sheets.

As of this writing, the IB industry has been almost completely annexed to other financial services, and we can safely assume the age of the universal bank/financial supermarket has arrived. On Wall Street, only two independent investment banks remain: Morgan-Stanley and Goldman-Sachs; the latter is extremely well-connected politically.6


NOTES:

1 "Paper" (commercial or government) is short term debt; it is usually acquired by money market funds, because it affords extremely low risk.

2 Money markets deposit accounts were an early breach in the wall between investment and commercial banking; they were accounts offered by banks whose value was tied by an index to the money market funds (1982; "Money Market Deposit Account," Financial & Investment Dictionary). They are required by law to invest in federally listed low-risk securities, of which paper is a major part. See "Money Market Funds," US Securities Exchange Commission, specifically the "Investment Company Act of 1940" (PDF). Commercial paper is not a very important market; it only accounts for $150-200 billion dollars of debt at any time (Federal Reserve). Money market fund balances are around $3.2 trillion (retail + institutional); see "Economic Indicators," GPO (July '08); they've become a rather important component of M3.

3 US Bureau of the Census, Economic Survey 2006, NAICS 52 (PDF).

4 US Bureau of the Census, Economic Survey 2002, NAICS 522110; unfortunately, the latest available commercial banking revenue data is for 2002. IBISWorld estimates 2005 revenues at 635.9 billion for '05.

5 Data on M&A activity specific to banking is proprietary; however, one source is Steven J. Pilloff, "Bank Merger Activity in the United States, 1994–2003" (PDF), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 2004). The largest spike was in 1998, the year before the much-anticipated dissolution of Glass-Steagall. However, this was mainly due to the merger of CitiCorp with Travellers.

6 Well connected politically: e.g.,
Conversely, E. Gerald Corrigan, once President of the Federal Reserve Bank of NY, is now a Goldman-Sachs Partner.


ADDITIONAL READING:

Steven Druckera & Manju Purib, "The Tying of Lending and Equity Underwriting" (PDF), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2004)

Peter Thal Larsen & Francesco Guerrera , "Investment banks’ future questioned," Financial Times (18 Sept 2008)

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17 September 2008

Notes on a Meltdown

First things first: how to describe the current crisis in global finance? Here are some of the events under consideration:

  • Washington Mutual, IndyMac, Wachovia: over-leveraged banks; WaMu has lost 96% of its market value (BW), while IndyMac (BW) was seized by the Feds and Wachovia implodes (NYT).
  • American International Group (AIG): extremely large insurance company; received $85 billion loan from US Treasury (17 Sept; BusinessWeek-1, -2, -3); >$1 trillion in assets; expected to be broken up;
  • Lehman Brothers Holdings: bankrupt (15 Sept); investment banking and trading divisions acquired by Barclays (BusinessWeek/AP);
  • FNMA "Fannie Mae" and FHLMC "Freddie Mac": see separate article
  • Merrill Lynch: avoided bankruptcy by merger with Bank of America (MW, 14 Sept) after losing almost $20 billion between July '07 and July '08 (BW).
  • Bear Sterns: bankrupt (Mar 14); JPMorganChase has acquired the firm (BusinessWeek).
This is not [entirely] confined to the USA: "Germany Dreads Financial Meltdown" (Der Spiegel); "Russia's financial crisis" (al-Jazeera video) "Russian Stock Market Plummets" (Russia Today video); "China's Stock Market 'World's Worst' In '08" (NTDTV video); and so on. The overseas effect appears to be mostly hidden from view, since bailouts in most developed countries are carried out secretly.


However, it appears so far that financial contagion originated in the USA and spread to other countries via their immense holdings of dollar-denominated assets. A logical corollary to this, in my view, is that for decades assets based in the USA and denominated in dollars were so popular that, despite our immense and growing trade deficit, non-Usonians would buy financial assets with the huge pools of dollars they acquired from ordinary business. Now, it seems as though dollars will be seen as having the same systemic risk as Korean won or Thai baht.


SOURCES & ADDITIONAL READING:

"FACTBOX: Government bailout tally tops $900 billion" (Reuters)

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10 September 2008

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) was created in 1938 by Act of Congress. The purpose was to purchase loans from conventional lending institutions, such as thrifts, thereby reducing the risk to the firm originating the loan. In order to ensure the loan was worth something, the new Federal Housing Authority (FHA) investigated the terms and the property before permitting the FNMA to buy the loan. In a very short time, the FNMA became a de facto monopoly for home loans, even though it did not originate any; all of the nation's lending institutions simply deferred to its FHA guidelines on making loans, and then passed them on to "Fannie Mae." In 1944, VA loans were added to the FNMA portfolio.


This is credited with stimulating a postwar boom in new housing; loans were now virtually risk-free to the originator, and easy to obtain.


In 1968, Fannie Mae was privatized; at the same time, a large segment was spun off as the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), which remains a division of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). GNMA specialized in special government development programs and higher risk loans; by 1997, it (rather than Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac) handled 95% of FHA loans, and 13% of residential loans.1 Ginnie Mae does not buy or sell loans or issue mortgage-backed securities (MBS); instead, it guarantees loans for fourth party issuers such as Countrywide or Wells Fargo.2


Two years after the split/privatization of Fannie Mae, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company (FHLMC, or "Freddie Mac") was created by Congress explicitly for the savings association system (thrifts).3 Freddie Mac usually buys loans with higher credit ratings than Fannie Mae does, and it favors special savings association loans; according to Wikipedia entries, the 2007 assets of Fannie Mae were $882 billion, and those for Freddie Mac were $794 billion.


Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are both known as government-sponsored entities (GSE's); in addition to the $1.68 trillion in assets that they hold in their portfolios, they sell an immense number of MBS's. Ginnie Mae, as mentioned above, contracts out the mortgages to fourth parties; assets held by it are not available.

A Brief Description of Mortgage-Backed Securities

When a mortgage is purchased by the GSE's, it becomes part of an immense pool of assets. This pool is divided into numerous subdivisions based on comparative risk; tiny pieces of the total are sold off as securities. The risk of default on any loan is distributed therefore evenly across all of the loans in the pool. MBS are commonly referred to as "pass-through" certificates because the principal and interest of the underlying loans is "passed through" to investors. The interest rate of the security is lower than the interest rate of the underlying loan to allow for payment of servicing and guaranty fees. Ginnie Mae MBS's are guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. Whether or not the mortgage payment is made, an investor in a Ginnie Mae MBS will receive payment of interest as well as principal. In the case of Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, there is considerable variation in available instruments.


In 1983, Freddie Mac introduced a variation on the MBS called a "collateralized mortgage obligation" (CMO). The CMO segments the cash flows from the underlying block of mortgage loans into four basic classes of bonds with differing maturities. Prior to the CMO, FNMA and FHLMC issued plain vanilla MBS's like the ones described above. The CMO prioritized payments received; high priority meant low risk (and therefore, low—but reliable—ROI), while low priority meant high risk (and therefore, potentially high ROI).


The GSE's: Public or Private?

Ginnie Mae is a division of the Department of HUD; it's obviously a public sector entity. It carries no MBS's on its balance sheet. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac became private sector entities when they issued public offerings of stock (1968 and 1970, respectively). Incidentally, I've noticed some confusion between "private sector" (which means, "non-governmental, for profit") and "privately held" (which means, there is no publicly issued stock in the firm). A publicly-held corporation usually is run for a profit, but has traded shares; a privately-held corporation is also run for a profit, but it's not possible to buy shares in that company. The GSE's were publicly traded until the recent melt-down wiped out 99.4% of their value.


However, as private-sector entities, there were some peculiarities about the GSE's:
  • Five members of the board of directors (a minority) were appointed by the White Houst e;
  • The Secretary of the Treasury could invest up to $2.25 billion in GSE securities;
  • They were exempt from corporate income taxes;
  • Their debt securities were eligible as collateral for federal government deposits of tax revenues in private banks;
  • Risk-weighting of their securities was only 20% for banking capital, as opposed to 100% for private-sector companies (under the terms of the Basel 2 Accords—PDF)
The last point is somewhat arcane, but the Basel Accords (1 & 2) were agreements to regulate the capital requirements of banking institutions worldwide; the purpose was to ensure that banks based in countries with lax standards would not have a competitive advantage vis-à-vis banks based in countries with sound standards. Banks based in the USA were allowed to use GSE shares to meet capital adequacy standards, with the understanding that GSE shares were effectively gold-plated.


Not surprisingly, the GSE's were regarded with hostility by the rest of the financial sector since they competed on a very uneven playing field. While lobbyists for the GSE's argue that the above features ensured that their funds cost the government nothing (and Fannie Mae/Freddy Mac were required to warn investors that their issues were not backed by the federal government), the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the opportunity cost to the federal government amounted to $6.5 billion annually (1996), of which $4.4 billion was passed through to customers. A 2001 survey revised the estimate slightly downward, to $5.4 billion in '95 and $10.6 billion in '00. Projections in the same report suggested this would reach $13-16 billion by '08.


There's some controversy over the cost of this. The CBO's estimates include a few hundred million in lost tax revenues, combined with several billions in opportunity costs. In other words, either the GSE's ought to have done something more with the off-book assets they enjoyed (e.g., used their fiduciary role to require better urban design, and subsidized the marginal cost) or else given the federal government the money. The money was "captured" from the financial services industry and its customers by the peculiar financial advantages the GSE's enjoyed.


NOTES:

Fourth party issuers: the first party is the home buyer; the second is the firm that originates the loan. GNMA (third party) guarantees the loan, and the approved issuer (say, Countrywide or Wells Fargo Home Mortgage) issues the actual GNMA MBS. Countrywide was the largest approved issuer in '07, writing $20.6 billion in MBS. The fifth party is anyone who buys the MBS.

ROI: return on investment; the payoff of an investment.

1 John W. Reilly, The Language of Real Estate, Dearborn Real Estate Education (2000), p.181

2 GNMA home page

3 "Savings and Loan Associations," US History Encyclopedia; captured from Answers.com


SOURCES & ADDITIONAL READING:

NYT: Fannie Mae, & Freddie Mac; see also Eric Dash, "Federal Mortgage Success Stories" (9 Sep 2008) on "Ginnie Mae" & "Farmer Mac"


Reuters: "FACTBOX: Government bailout tally tops $900 billion" (16 Sept 2008)

John W. Reilly, The Language of Real Estate, Dearborn Real Estate Education (2000)

Congressional Budget Office, "Assessing the Public Costs and Benefits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac" (May 1996)

Freddie Mac, "Information Statement" (PDF), includes general reference on firm (26 March 2001)

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Evolving Attitudes toward the Federal Deficit, 1953-2006

"Macroeconomic policy in the 1960s: the causes and consequences of a mistaken revolution"
Christina D. Romer, University of California, Berkeley (September 2007)

The conventional wisdom for students of economics is that, after 1944, the developed economies of North America and Western Europe embraced Keynesian economics: the presumption of full employment was abandoned in economic analysis, as was the idea that "supply creates its own demand." This generally prevailed until the late 1970s, when it was succeeded by monetarism (to 1986) and then Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory, now called Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) and very much in vogue in the profession.

Continuing my summary of the conventional wisdom, the notion goes that the period of Keynesian dominance in the USA (at least) was accompanied by heavy reliance on fiscal policy. After 1981, for example, the effect of monetarist policy and massive tax cuts led to a staggering deficit in the federal budget (graph) utterly surpassing anything before or since.1  Despite the anathemas pronounced against Keynes, most policy ideas are highly distorted versions of Keynesian: the White House typically insists on stimulus packages (now during expansions, to prevent a recession) or else tax cuts (either on ideological grounds or to further stimulate the economy.  Economists have roundly denounced the idea of fiscal policy, but there are still lot of them applauding deregulation and tax cuts
"to create jobs."

One challenge here is that Keynes died in 1946, unable to comment thereafter on the quality of implementation of his ideas.  Academic interpretation of his General Theory was influenced by John Hicks and Alvin Hansen, who developed the IS-LM model used for teaching macroeconomics until quite recently.  Meanwhile, some really good enhancements to the theory, such as the work of A.W. Phillips, were misrepresented by polemicists against Keynesianism (and oversimplified by practitioners).2

I also feel the need to introduce another historical figure, the journalist Abba P. Lerner. Lerner's relevant views were outlined in a short tract, Functional Finance (1943) in which he argued that the true insights of Keynes were far more profound than his disciples were letting on.  In effect, he argued that Keynes had failed to realize the full implications of his own ideas.
Lerner (1943), p.3: The central idea is that government fiscal policy, its spending and taxing, its borrowing and repayment of loans, its issue of new money and its withdrawal of money, shall all be undertaken with an eye only to the results of these actions on the economy and not to any established traditional doctrine about what is sound or unsound.
The rest of his ideas follow in the same mold.  Anyone reading Functional Finance will see in it the modern lack of concern for deficit spending or sound money policies.  Lerner is merely concerned with the consequences of tax increases and spending increases on inflation or employment levels.

We now turn to Christina Romer's paper, which is a frontal assault on Abba Lerner.  At first, her paper looks as though it is going to appeal to tradition: she dwells on the fact that, until 1962, the Federal Reserve and the budgetary planners in the White House and Congress took deficits seriously, whereas Kennedy and Johnson did not: for shame!
Romer (2007), p.10: However, the changing attitude toward fiscal discipline seemed to go even further than this. Whereas balancing the budget and retiring the public debt was an objective good for Truman and beneficial to growth for Eisenhower, it seems to have become almost superfluous for policymakers in the 1960s. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to find references in the Economic Reports or Budget Messages of the 1960s to a long-run goal of budget balance. The one exception is the 1963 Economic Report which stated: “The problem is to maintain a relationship between the deficits and surpluses of the various sectors that will permit this balance to be reached at a satisfactory level of economic activity – and without a prolonged succession of government deficits” (p. 74). But even here, it seems clear that maintaining full employment is the key concern, and the commitment to long-run balance feels vague and half-hearted. 
Presidents Kennedy through Ford embraced the idea that tax cuts would pay for themselves by enhanced economic growth, which did not happen (although tax cuts were on very high top marginal rates).

Prof. Romer also applies the same criticism to monetary policy; she analyzes monetary expansion in accordance with the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke monetary rule (p.14) and finds it unacceptably lax.
Romer (2007), p.16: The consequences of the economic beliefs and the resulting policy actions in the 1960s and 1970s are well known. Inflation, which was close to 1% at the start of the Kennedy administration in 1961, rose steadily over the decade, ending at over 5%. It then rose even more dramatically in the 1970s. While the effect of the oil price shocks in 1974 and 1978 are quite obvious, modern scholars, such as DeLong (1997) and Barsky and Kilian (2001), have been convincing that monetary expansion and loose policy more generally were the key source of the inflation in these decades. The expansionary bias in both monetary and fiscal policy led to rates of inflation unheard of in peacetime. 
Romer praises Ronald Reagan and Marty Feldstein's stated views that a balanced budget was a long term good, but mysteriously ignores the cynical political exploitation of this view.  It's as if she overlooked the ideological basis of the Conservative Movement, that it was redeemed through faith in sound finance (rather than works--something that would be left to the infidel Clinton to perform).

The main points of her essay are startlingly unsubstantiated. She claims that deficits do have an effect on well-being, but she doesn't explain why or cite conditions that determine when deficits become dangerous (pp. 25-27).  She ignores the ideological convictions and priors of the administrations that submit budgets, as if budget decisions are made by schools of economists, and she cites little more than a hunch that the Great Moderation happened because Fed policies were sound (p.20).  In fact, she speaks approvingly of the new policies, when deficit spending has become far worse than it was in the 1960s. 


Christina Romer may well have a compelling argument for believing that functional finance is the culprit (FWIW, she never mentions the phrase, alluding instead to a James M. Buchanan book that excoriates John M. Keynes). But this paper is not convincing, and I remain convinced that the contents of budget priorities, rather than functional finance, are at the heart of America's financial issues.


NOTES
  1.  One point bears noting: the period 1983-1990 (the recovery phase) featured an aggregate real GDP growth of 38%; that of 1991-2000, 43%.  During the first period, the total public debt grew from 33% of GDP to 53%, while during the second period, it started at 57%, rose to 64% (1994), then declined back to 54%.   In other words, in the 1980s, the rather large expansion of the economy was propelled by an unsustainable and unwholesome explosion of expansionary deficits; in the 1990s, the larger expansion of the economy was accompanied by a net contraction of public debt.

    This point must never be forgotten: it's pretty easy to have an impressive economic showing when you allow chronic deficits of  >3% of GDP.  Reducing the deficit and growing the economy is a much more impressive feat.  
  2. Phillips is usually accused of positing a simplistic relationship between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment.  See A.W. Phillips, "The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957" Economica, New Series, Vol. 25, No. 100 (Nov., 1958), pp. 283-299